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Abstract 
Seed technology ventures require external sources of debt and equity funding, once they 
have exhausted founders personal resources, to achieve their potential economic impact. The 
primary source of equity finance for seed ventures is from Business Angels who invest their own 
money in the company and frequently provide additional sources of assistance to the 
entrepreneur. Once seed ventures have completed their business plans, however informally, they 
pitch their opportunity to potential investors, However, less than three per cent of these pitches to 
Business Angels are successful. It is suggested that a major reason for this low success rates is a 
lack of understanding by pitching entrepreneurs of how Business Angels make their investment 
decisions. Investigating how Business Angels make their investment decisions will identify some 
of the causes of this high failure rate. In turn this will help to suggest ways for entrepreneurs to 
increase their likelihood of successful interactions with investors.  
Real-time techniques that involve observing successive interactions between five Business 
Angels and 150 pitching entrepreneurs are used to gather data on the investment decision-
making process. The technique of observational interaction has been used in psychological 
research to observe interpersonal relationships and their development within the context of a   
complex process. This complex process can best be understood by breaking down the process 
into stages. In this research the initial interaction between entrepreneur and Business Angel is 
investigated. It is found that initially the Business Angels use a filtering technique to 
expeditiously reject most opportunities. This allows, allow them to concentrate their limited 
resources on further investigation of a few promising opportunities that appear to offer the 
highest potential return.  
 
   iv 
The unique data set used in this research is taken from a reality TV show – CBC Dragons’ 
Den – where entrepreneurs participate in order to receive real investment from five wealthy 
individuals known as “Dragons”. Using the video material gathered during the recording of the 
show it is possible to observe how the five Dragons initially filter out most opportunities, before 
looking at more positive factors when determining their interest in investing in the few 
opportunities remaining. This filtering process involves a non-compensatory technique - 
Elimination-By-Aspects, where the presence of a single one of eight potential fatal flaws is 
sufficient reason for rejection. While this may not be the most accurate technique, it is the most 
cost effective approach to decision-making for the investors. To increase accuracy at later stages, 
the investors adopt a more compensatory decision-making approaches.  
Improved understanding of the staged nature of the process, and how Business Angels 
identify fatal flaws at the initial stage of the interaction, provides valuable insights to both 
investors and entrepreneurs. Armed with this knowledge they can take steps to eliminate such 
flaws and improve the overall efficiency of the decision making process. This in turn will lead to 
an increase in successful outcomes of such interactions and consequently the number of seed 
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1. Introduction 
Business Angels (BAs) are private investors who provide “risk capital directly to new and 
growing businesses in which they have no family connection” (Mason and Harrison, 1996, page 
153). BAs fund 30 times as many early stage ventures as corporate investors, known as Venture 
Capitalists (VCs) and are important catalyzers of the economic activity stimulated by new 
venture creation (Sohl, 2007). However, most of the interactions between fund-seeking 
entrepreneurs and BAs lead to failure, with less than 3% leading to an investment (Mason and 
Harrison, 1994; Riding, et al. 1997). Researchers, such as, Freear et al. (2002), Mason and 
Harrison (2002) and Riding et al. (2007) suggest that this high failure rate is because the current 
investment process is inefficient, and call for research to identify opportunities for process 
improvement. 
Prior research suggests that the investment decision-making process comprises a number of 
stages before the final decision to invest, or not, is reached (Feeney et al., 1999; Harrsion et al., 
1997). However, as Landström (1998) identifies, most studies only look at a single stage of the 
process and fail to place each stage within the overall context of the investment decision. 
Specifically, Landström suggests future studies should consider  “investment as a process in 
which decision-making criteria may vary in the course of time” (1998, page 322). Riding et al. 
echo this suggestion and note “there remains considerable room for research on the nature of the 
investment process itself” and “how the various decision criteria are weighted at different points in 
the process” (2007, page 335). Our research is a response to both suggestions. 
Research on the decision-making process has been constrained by two factors, previous 
data has focused on collecting data from the end of the overall process, rather than at each stage 
of the process; secondly most research has gathered data on factors that lead to a positive 
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investment decisions rather than gathering data on the causes of failure (Wiltbank, 2005). Riding 
et al. (1997) identify the causes of such limitations, noting that part of the problem is because 
observing BA decision-making processes is difficult.  Investor-entrepreneur interactions are 
usually geographically dispersed (Landström, 1995) and essentially private in nature (Mason and 
Harrison, 2000). Where data has been gathered, it relies on investors’ post-decision recollections, 
making it difficult to isolate intermediate effects (Svenson, 1979), and compensate for the biases 
introduced by investors’ recollections  (Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998). Further, most data that has 
been gathered has been from opportunities that received investment,  This limits the possibility 
of identifying causes of failure in the decision-making processes and identify opportunities for 
process improvement  (Sharma and Mahajan, 1980).   
In this paper, I focus on the first stage of the interaction between entrepreneur and investor 
in the investment process – the selection stage where measurable failure rates are highest 
(Riding, et al., 1997). During this stage, I follow the insights of Mason and Harrison (2002) who 
suggest that investors use a time efficient decision-making process to filter out most 
opportunities so they can devote more time to the few opportunities that best meet their 
investment criteria. These observations lead to my research questions: During the first stage of 
the investment decision-making process, what factors do Business Angels consider when 
deciding which opportunities should be rejected? Are these factors the same as those used by a 
Business Angel to make their final decision to invest or not?   
Using observational interaction techniques to overcome the constraints identified in prior 
research, and access to a rich data set that includes both successes and failures, I confirm the use 
of eight critical non-compensatory factors used by investors to reject opportunities at the 
selection stage of the process. In our sample, the failure of an opportunity to reach a minimum 
standard in any one of these critical factors leads to rapid rejection of the opportunity, thus the 
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term ‘fatal flaw’. This decision-making technique greatly reduces the number of opportunities to 
be considered at subsequent process stages, allowing the investor to devote more time for further 
investigation to each opportunity that has not been rapidly rejected. However, while the absence 
of these critical factors is highly predictive of the filtering stage of the process, there is no 
evidence that the presence of the same factors is able to predict funding. This suggests that BAs 
consider additional factors to these eight, before making their final investment decision. 
I proceed as follows.  First, I provide a background on extant research on the BA 
investment decision-making process and raise concerns about the biases and constraints of prior 
research. Using insights on the staged nature of the investment process and adaptive decision-
making techniques, I propose the filtering technique used by BAs during the selection stage of 
the process and suggest eight critical factors used to differentiate between continuing to engage 
in the evaluation of a particular opportunity and the decision to reject it.  I confirm that investors 
identify the presence of a single fatal flaw as a cost-effective filtering technique based on our 
observations of 50 interactions between entrepreneurs and investors who participate in a Reality 
TV show. The use of a real-time approach, that gathers and records data while the event is taking 
place, allows some of the identified biases to be overcome, and a rich data set collected that 
provides both qualitative and quantative insights. This technique allows each of the stages in the 
overall process to be observed and provides insights into how BAs adapt their decision-making 
techniques at different stages in the process.  Analysis of this data set provides insights into 
entrepreneurial behaviours in this context and how the information exchanges with the potential 
investor can increase or reduce the likelihood of an opportunity moving to the next stage of the 
investment process. I conclude this paper by suggesting some direct implications for 
entrepreneurs fro our research and then outlining how this research can contribute both 
theoretical and practical insights that might stimulate future research in this area.  
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2. BA investment decisions   
High growth-potential companies often require additional equity financing. However, the 
percentage of such ventures able to attract third party funding is low (Riding, et al., 1997). This 
is traditionally attributed to the fact that either many ventures are not ready for investment or 
there is a lack of available risk capital.  Mason and Harrison (2002) challenge this view, 
suggesting there are inefficiencies in the investment decision-making process that limit the 
number of ventures funded. They propose that improved process understanding will reduce the 
number of failures in interactions between entrepreneurs and investors, an insight that this paper 
builds on.   
Most research that attempts to understand the BA decision-making process usually starts 
by assuming that BAs make their investment decision in an identical manner to VCs. This 
assumption often occurs because, it is assumed that VCs are professional experts in this area and 
therefore they must make better decisions. In addition, there is an assumption that VCs constitute 
the major source of funds for new ventures. It is also considerably easier to collect VC 
information than BA data due to the increased accountability VCs have to their funders for their 
decision-making processes. Recent research, for example by Van Osnabrugge (2000), in 
examining the differences between BA investment decision-making and that of VCs identifies 
several causes of these differences.  The most important factors being the differences in 
objectives and expectations that exist between BAs and VCs and the fundamental difference in 
roles of each set of investors, due to differences in agency relationships -– BAs invest their own 
money, while VCs invest funders’ money. The increased level of VC accountability affects both 
their decision-making criteria and decision justification. 
VCs are also not the largest funders of seed ventures. In fact, BAs rather than VCs 
dominate the early stage of venture funding, investing more money and about 30 times more 
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frequently (Sohl, 2007).  As Sapienza et al. (1996) note, this is partly a function of the 
investment expectations of VC funds, which encourage VCs to invest in later stage opportunities, 
where liquidity events are sooner and perceived risk levels lower. It is also a function of the 
important coaching role that BAs can undertake, an investment in time which is more 
challenging for VCs due to their need control their management expense ratios. The relative 
importance of BAs as a source of early stage finance is also noted by Madill et al., (2005) who 
observe that pre-existing BA funding is a pre-requisite for VC investment in 90% of cases.  The 
importance of BA investments, current low interaction success rates and incomplete 
understanding of BA decision-making processes, motivate this research. As Mason and Stark 
(2004) suggest, recognizing how BAs, VCs and banks differ in their decision-making processes, 
will allow entrepreneurs to respond appropriately to each one and increase the likelihood of 
success in each case.   
 
2.1 Factors considered by BAs when making their investment decisions  
Research on BA investment practices dates back to the early eighties when Wetzel was 
motivated to understand the importance and demographic characteristics of BAs in a specific 
regional context - New Hampshire, U.S.A (Wetzel, 1981). Further demographic research was 
carried out by: Haar, et al. (1988) in the U.S.A., Mason and Harrison (1995) in the U.K. and 
Riding, et al. (1993) in Canada. These studies conclude that BAs are: wealthy males who had 
direct startup experience and invested in local ventures. To explain BAs’ motivations and 
behaviors, DalCin, et al. (1993) attempted to better understand their psychological attributes 
concluding that BAs have a high internal locus of control and need for achievement.  
Research on the characteristics of BAs has now been extended to help explain their 
investment decision-making processes (Feeney et al., 1999; Sudek, 2006). This research looks at 
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factors considered by BAs and the decision-making process itself. Specifically positive factors 
BAs consider when making a decision to invest identified in prior research are summarized in 
Table 1 (Bachher and Guild, 1996; Feeney et al., 1999; Haar et al., 1998; Haines et al., 2003; 
Landström, 1998; Paul, 2007; Sudek, 2006; Van Osnabrugge, 2000).  Product, market and 
entrepreneur are all important categories in the decision-making process, as are the financial 
potential of the business and the investment terms (Sudek, 2006). Specific individual factors 
frequently mentioned as being of high importance include: an identifiable barrier to future entry, 
the presence of a large and growing market and evidence of a sustainable business model. In the 
Table, very high positive ratings are indicated by +++, high positive ratings by +++ and positive 
ratings by +++. 
Differences in the nature of each factor can affect how the BA assesses it, for example, 
some of the factors are objective - such as number of years of relevant entrepreneurial experience 
or the date a patent was issued. These can be rapidly and easily determined. Others are more 
subjective, such as entrepreneurial trustworthiness or investment-fit and take longer to assess. 
Much of the previous work that identifies the relative importance of these factors ignores how or 
when in the process, each factor is assessed. Despite our observations about agency differences 
affecting the decision-making process, there are few obvious differences between the factors 
considered by BAs and VCs. This is apparent when comparing our analysis of BA factors with a 
similar summary of factors considered by VCs compiled by Zacaharakis and Meyer (1998, page 
61), shown in the Appendix.  
Importantly, Feeney et al. (1999) and Mason and Harrison (2003), note the absence of 
certain factors linked to the rejection of a specific opportunity. These negative factors, also 
shown in Table 1, include:  entrepreneur experience, prototype availability, patent protection and  
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TABLE 1:  
Factors considered by Business Angels when making investment decisions 



























































































































Interest/Benefits  * ++        ++    ++  +++    ++  ­­­  ‐  ‐‐‐ 
Status  * ++                  ‐‐‐    







Innovation/Quality     +++      +++            ‐  ‐ 
Market size  * +    +  +++  +  +++    +++    ‐  ‐‐‐ 
Customer engagement  * +                     
Growth potential   +++  +  +++  +++  ++    ++  ++      ‐ 






Market dynamics    ++        +++  +  +      ++  ­­­  ‐  ‐ 
Industry experience  * +++  +  +      +++  +++  +++  +++  ‐‐‐  ­­­  ‐‐‐ 
Track record   +  +++  +    ++    +++      ++  ‐  ‐   
Passion, commitment   +++  +  +  +++        +++  ‐‐‐     
Integrity, trustworthy     +++  +  +++        +++  ‐‐‐     










Expectations     +++  +            ‐‐‐     
Profitable/ realistic  *   +++    ++        ++  ­­­  ‐‐‐  ‐‐ 
Capitalization, cash flow          ++          ++  ‐‐‐  ‐   
Size of investment     +++    +        +       
Plan/presentation    +  +        +++    +      ‐‐‐  ‐  ‐ ‐‐ 






Liquidity      +++  +  +   ++    +  +++  ‐    ‐‐ 
Team characteristics               +++  +++  +++    +++  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐   
Entrepreneur fit    ++  +  +++  +++      ++  ++  ‐‐‐     
Business fit          +   ++    ++  +++  +  ‐  ‐  ‐‐ 
Location    ++        +   +  +  +++         
Referral source    +++    +              ‐   






Investor role    +++  +++  +++    +++  ++             
Research Method    Q  T  F  T, P  Q  P  R  P  T  I,R  V,R 
Analysis    M  Q  Q  M  C    Q  VM  Q  Q  Q 
Number of Business Angels     20  153   51/20 302  73  121  30  72   153 1  30 
Research Methods: Q1 = Questionnaire with on-site interview/support, T = Telephone survey, P = Postal 
questionnaire, R = Real time technique, F = Focus groups, V = Video base  
Analysis: M = Mean ranking, C = Conjoint Analysis, Q = Qualitative and quantative response analysis  
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projected profitability (Harrison et al., 1997), product attractiveness and market conditions 
(Feeney et al., 1999), and relevant entrepreneurial experience or a growing market opportunity 
(Riding et al., 1997). In fact compared to the positive factors, Harrison et al. (1997) note that 
these negative factors can be fatal, such that their absence immediately eliminates an opportunity 
from further consideration. For this reason I call them ‘fatal flaws’. 
I also include in Table 1 an assessment tool developed by the Canadian Innovation Centre - 
the Critical Factor Assessment. This assessment tool, based on the product development work of 
Cooper (1994), uses eight critical factors that are both positively and negatively correlated to 
long term business potential – but not directly to investment potential. The identification of so 
many factors is confusing to the entrepreneur trying to make sense of the relative importance of 
each positive and negative factor. I suggest that at the initial stage of the investment decision-
making process, the eight factors identified in the Critical Factor Assessment are the most 
important, with other factors of relatively smaller importance or considered at alternate stages in 
the process. How and when each factor is considered is discussed further in Section 3.   
 
2.2 The BA investment decision-making process 
Researchers have identified the staged nature of the investment decision-making process, 
suggesting different decision-making activities occur at each stage. The general model includes a 
stage that occurs before the interaction between investor and entrepreneur takes place, the 
interaction itself and the stage once the investment has been made. In Figure 1, I show three 
models of the BA investment process (Duxbury et al., 1997; Paul et al., 2007; Riding et al., 
1997) alongside two classic VC investment models (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Tyebjee and 
Bruno, 1984). The first formal model of the BA process was developed by DalCin, et al., (1993) 
and reveals all three phases of this linear model, which include both the pre and post interaction 
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stages: (a) identification, (b) screening (c) diligence, (d) negotiation, (e) deal consummation and 
(f) venture management. It is this model that was expanded by Riding et al. in 1997, when sub-
stages in both the identification and screening stages of the process were added. An 
complementary approach was developed in 2000 by Van Osnabrugge, that has recently been 
confirmed by Paul et al. (2007) based on interviews with 30 BAs.  
The pre-interaction stage of the process - identification, occurs when trusted third parties 
refer a limited number of fund-seeking entrepreneurs to a specific interested investor (Fried and 
Hisrich, 1994). Amatucci and Sohl (2004) note that it is difficult to obtain a first meeting with 
the investor without a referral from an individual with a high reputation. The BA will also likely 
consider the nature of the business, and the track record of the entrepreneur before agreeing to 
meet. 
FIGURE 1 
 Stages of the decision-making process 
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At the next stage, the first part of the interaction process itself, the investors uses a 
screening or selection process to filter out most opportunities with limited business potential – 
based primarily on the information provided by the entrepreneur. This avoids the investor in 
wasting time on opportunities with limited business potential. During the next stage of the 
process - evaluation or assessment, the potential business value and investment risk of the 
opportunity are determined. Some of the decision-making models refer to this stage as diligence1 
because the investor validates the information provided by the entrepreneur based on his prior 
knowledge and access to third party information. This process also requires the BA to expend 
effort in interpreting the validated information and using it to complete an initial assessment of 
the future value of the venture and the perceived risks faced both by the venture and their 
investment in it. The investor then modifies his or her valuation and risk assessment of the 
venture and investment based on a combination of direct experience and their availability of 
complementary assets. If this modified assessment of risk and return meets their investment 
criteria, he or she will make an offer to invest that includes a valuation and a shareholder 
agreement that structures the proposed working relationship. Subsequent to investment, both 
parties work together to manage the growth of the business, before identifying and agreeing an 
appropriate liquidity event.   
 Both Paul et al. (2007) and Riding et al. (2007) point out that these process models are 
simplified and do not reflect the iterative nature of the process. They note that viewing the 
process as a linear progression does not reflect its complexity or that opportunities can become 
stuck at various stages. As Riding et al. suggest “there remains considerable room for research on 
the nature of the investment process itself.” They go on to recommend the use of models from other 
                                                
1 We confine the use of the term diligence to a more expensive part of the consummation process that takes place 
once an agreement to invest has been made. It involves outside assistance from accountants, lawyers or 
technologists to verify factual claims made during the interaction by the entrepreneur (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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disciplines that posit “how individuals arrive at decisions,” noting that this issue does not yet “appear 
to have been considered with respect to business angels” and conclude there is a need to study “how 
the various decision criteria are weighted at different points in the process” (2007, page 336). This 
research responds to these suggestions. 
 
2.3 Identifying and addressing the limitations of prior research 
 Prior research that relies on data gathered from investors’ post decision recollections, 
limits our ability to understand how and when each factor is considered in the overall decision-
making process. Zacharakis and Meyer (1998) observe further problems in relying on investors’ 
recollections, noting investors do not always themselves understand how they make decisions - 
instead relying on “gut feel”. Shepherd and Zacharakis (1999) also identify another problem 
when relying on investor’s recollections  - the introduction of confirmation seeking and outcome 
or hindsight biases. 
Confirmation seeking bias occurs because an investor may justify his previous decision-
making process by interpreting information in a way that confirms his preconceptions (Mynatt et 
al., 1977). As a result, an investor tends to provide reasons to defend his previous decision rather 
than trying to recollect the actual decision process he or she used at the time. Outcome or 
hindsight bias occurs when the decision-maker reflects on his decision once the outcome of that 
decision is known (Baron and Hershey, 1988). Retrospective data gathering allows an investor to 
modify recollections of how a decision was made based on outcome information obtained 
subsequent to the decision-making process rather than solely on information he knew at the time. 
This is a particular issue in decision-making under uncertainty. At the time of the decision there 
were future risks and uncertainties that subsequently may be perceived as being more predictable 
than they were (Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975). As a result, an investor tends to remember what he 
or she thought would happen more strongly if those predictions end up being correct. The 
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combined effect of these biases increases the likelihood that decision-making explanations do not 
reflect the actual decision-making process that was used.  
Selection bias causes another problem that limits understanding of factors that affect 
negative and positive decisions.  Most research data is gathered from companies that receive 
investment, rather than companies that do not. This limits researchers the ability to identify 
factors that differentiate between success and failure. For example, it is difficult to use 
entrepreneurial confidence as a diagnostic decision-making tool, as suggested by Sudek (2006), 
when Astebro et al. (2007) find evidence that too much confidence is often linked to failure. To 
fully understand the role of each factor in the decision-making process, it is necessary to better 
understand its differential impact on success or failure. However, collecting data from companies 
that fail to attract funding is challenging. Many of these companies do not survive - so accessing 
information subsequent to the event is difficult. Even in cases where decision-makers who did 
not invest are identified, it can be hard to understand their real reasons for their decisions.  
Hall and Hofer (1993) suggest real-time data gathering techniques can overcome these 
constraints and biases. These techniques record data while the interaction progresses allowing for 
subsequent analysis and observation of detailed process. The collection of this type of data set, 
which includes both successful outcomes and failures, provides an opportunity to identify 
diagnostic factors that differentiate between the two. It also facilitates an understanding of when 
in the overall decision-making process each factor is considered and how the investor gathers 
data about each of the factors of interest. 
Verbal protocol analysis, described by Ericsson and Simon (1984), is the most commonly 
used real-time technique first applied to VC investor decision-making by Sandberg, et al. (1988). 
Mason and Stark (2004) used the same technique to record BA’s thoughts about the investment 
decision-making process. The use of this technique addresses some of the validity concerns 
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identified but does not eliminate several of the identified biases because it still relies on 
investor’s recollections. Outcome bias can be reduced using concurrent verbal protocol analysis, 
where the investor records his or her thoughts while making the investment decision. However, 
recording these insights in real-time can inhibit the actual interaction (Kuusela and Paul, 2000). 
Alternatively, if the investor uses verbal protocol analysis post-interaction, by referring to tapes 
or transcripts, he or she can again impose outcome or confirmation-seeking biases. An 
alternative approach, designed to remove these biases has been experimentation, with 
participants playing the role of either investor or entrepreneur (Cable and Shane, 1997). 
However, experimental techniques may contain hypothetical responses that reduce external 
validity, as they cannot replicate the entrepreneur’s attachment to the idea, emulate the real risks 
involved or place the interaction as the first step in the development of a long-term relationship. I 
conclude that a better research method is the use of third party trained observers to gather and 
analyze information exchanges and participant behaviours in an environment, with real risk and 
the knowledge by participants of the long-term implications of any negotiated agreement. This 




    14
 
3. Hypothesizing the investment decision-making model  
The nature of the interaction between entrepreneur and investor, like similar complex 
negotiations, proceeds through a number of stages, with behaviours evolving as the parties move 
from one stage to the next (Adair and Brett, 2005). I suggest that investment decision-making 
can be broken down into a number of stages where the investor adapts his decision-making 
technique at each process stage. Based on the investor’s previous investment experience he or 
she selects the most cost-effective technique to use at each stage, starting with one technique 
which he or she has developed based on previous experience and then changing this  technique at 
subsequent stages in the process as the nature of the context changes. This research focuses on 
the selection stage of the process, when the BA is faced with evaluating a large number of 
potential investment opportunities. At this stage the investors chooses a decision-making 
technique that minimizes his or her required effort per opportunity to rapidly reject most 
opportunities, while limiting the chance of discarding one of high potential. This elimination of 
most opportunities from further consideration allows him or her to focus a much greater level of 
attention on the remaining opportunities of greater interest. At these subsequent stages, when 
most unsuitable opportunities have been filtered out, the investor changes his decision-making 
technique to identify positive reasons to invest.  
 
3.1 The investment decision-making process 
Payne, et al. (1993) define decision-making as taking and then processing several pieces of 
information in order to reach a conclusion. They note the effort required by the decision-maker is 
a function of: the number of pieces of information considered, their complexity and the context 
in which the decision is made. They suggest that individuals break down complex decisions into 
a series of stages and choose the most cost-effective decision-making technique to use at each 
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stage - where cost-effectiveness is a function of effort and level of accuracy required. A decision-
maker, faced with making similar decisions over time, will use heuristics to choose his decision-
making techniques, although the choice of technique used can also be influenced by the 
investor’s need to justify his decision-making to others. A summary of the primary decision-
making techniques developed by Payne et al. (1986) is provided in the Appendix, which also 
shows a figure that identifies the relationship between effort in decision-making and accuracy of 
decision. 
Shepherd et al. (2005) note the time constraints placed on VCs that limit the amount of 
time they can spend evaluating new investment opportunities. BAs are also time constrained, as 
they often undertake their investment activities on a part time basis and have to balance 
management of their existing portfolio and other responsibilities with the identification of new 
opportunities (Mason and Harrison, 2002). Payne et al. (1993) identify one of the most common 
filtering technique deployed at an early stage in a selection process is Elimination-By-Aspects 
(EBA) first noted by Tversky in 1972. While EBA is often the most cost effective initial 
decision-making technique, it does not always provide the most accurate outcomes. The fact that 
investors are willing to use it implies they are willing to trade off a reduced effort requirement 
for a less accurate outcome. 
In explaining EBA, Tversky (1972) suggests that it is different from the traditional view of 
multi-factor decision-making where important factors in each opportunity are assessed and the 
one with the highest weighted average of all factors is selected. This compensatory approach 
allows a high score in one factor to compensate for a low score in another. In contrast, EBA uses 
elimination criteria to reject unsuitable options. This reduces the need to assess each factor or 
determine its relative importance, because as soon as a single ‘fatal flaw’ is identified the 
interaction is terminated.  To use EBA, decision-makers first consciously or sub-consciously 
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identify critical factors and then determine a minimum standard for each. Any opportunity that 
fails to meet this minimum standard for any factor is determined to have a ‘fatal flaw’ and 
rejected. This non-compensatory technique means that the presence of a single ‘fatal flaw’ 
cannot be compensated for by other positive factors.  
 
3.2 Identifying fatal flaws and critical factors  
Critical factors in either the entrepreneur or opportunity must be easy to measure and must 
be objective – that is their presence will be readily agreed between different assessors. In 
addition, the absence of certain of these critical factors, termed fatal flaws must also be easy to 
assess minimum standards where absence is highly correlated to business failure. If critical 
factors are to be used as a diagnostic then high scores should be positively correlated to business 
success and low scores to business failure. Important critical factors include: company sales 
revenue, patent status and entrepreneur work experience. Despite the opportunity for some 
subjective interpretation of these objective factors, if the inter-rater reliability between trained 
observers comparing assessments of these factors is high, then we can confirmed the objective 
nature of these factors.  
The use of objective diagnostic tools and the ease with which the associated factors can be 
determined facilitates their use early in the decision-making process. At later stages in the 
process, subjective factors, such as perceived risk and expected return, can also be considered 
(Fried and Hisrich, 1994). These subjective factors require more effort by the investor to assess 
and quantify and are based on the investor’s expert knowledge: increasing the likelihood that 
individual investors will assess them differently. Factors considered later in the process are 
compensatory, where a high score in one factor can compensate for a low score in another factor 
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(Muzyka et al., 1996). For example, higher expected levels of return can compensate for a higher 
level of perceived risk.  
To provide a starting point for the assessment of the investment decision-making process, 
an existing business diagnostic tool was chosen – the Critical Factor Assessment. This tool was 
developed by the Canadian Innovation Centre and considers factors that are both diagnostic and 
objective (CIC, 2006). Over thirty years, the Canadian Innovation Centre has deployed this tool 
looking at more than 10,000 innovations, in order to determine their business potential and 
provide a diagnostic too to interested parties. The Critical Factor Assessment tool uses eight 
factors, where not achieving a minimum standard in any one of the eight factors creates a fatal 
flaw linked to failure. In addition, high positive scores in each factor are correlated to business 
success. In 2004, Astebro validated the predictive ability of this tool by comparing 561 initial 
assessments of market potential with product launch outcomes five years later. In his sample, 
very early stage entrepreneurs accessed the federally funded Innovators Assistance Programme 
operated by the Canadian Innovation Centre to predict their likelihood of market success (not 
venture funding).  Astebro (2004) verified the predictive accuracy of the Critical Factor 
Assessment, comparing forecasts of success and failure against actual product entry in the 
market. He noted that the Critical Factor Assessment’s overall predictive accuracy was 79.1% - 
74.2% accurate at predicting successful product launch and 79.7% accurate at predicting failures 
to launch the product. Given the lead-time between the study and the outcome measurement (five 
years), and the many implementation issues that can inhibit potentially successful products from 
reaching the market, this predictive accuracy is very high. As Astebro (2004) himself notes in the 
study the Critical Factor Assessment has about twice the predictive accuracy of professional 
VCs.   
The eight critical factors detailed in Table 2, look primarily at product and market factors. 
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The presence of each factor is linked to market success, while the absence of each factor is 
directly correlated to failure. Within the eight factors three are product related factors: adoption – 
how easily will potential users adopt the product, development stage – is a high level of 
technology development still required, and protectability – is there a barrier to entry for potential 
competitors. Three market factors are included: customer engagement – does the product meet a 
real need, route to market – is there a realistic route to market, and market potential – is there a 
sufficient market to provide an interesting opportunity. In addition, there is one factor about 
relevant entrepreneurial experience, and one about the realism of the financial projections of the 
company.  
TABLE  2: 
Canadian Innovation Centre’s Critical Factor Assessment 
Factor Key Question Rating Explanation 
A Customers will easily adopt product or service 




Will customers in 
target market easily 
adopt this product? C No clear benefits, or major adoption issues  
A Finished product  




Product ready for market, 
or still major work required 
before it ships? C Needs more research and development 
A Product patented or significant other barrier  




How easy will it be for 
other people to copy the 
product or service? C Anyone could copy it easily. 
A Customers in place, or committed to purchasing 




Is a first customer 
identified? Does product 
meet customer need? C No first customers identified. 
A Realistic marketing plan / distribution partner  




Is there a realistic 
marketing plan and route to 
market?  C Limited thought given to distribution issues 
A Large market potential (i.e over $20 million) 




Is there a large market for 
this product? 
C Unable to predict - likely less than $5 million. 
A Significant relevant experience 




Has senior management 
direct / relevant entrep-
reneurial experience? C No evidence of required experience 
A Sound business model and cash management  




Evidence they are going to 
make money? Asking for 
enough investment?   C No evidence of profit or cash management  
Numeric equivalents: (A+ = 10, A= 9, A- = 8, B+ = 6, B = 5, B- = 4, C+ =2, C = 1, C- = 0) 
© Canadian Innovation Centre, 1996, 2001, 2006 
 




I have suggested that during the selection process the investor, based on his or her time 
constraints and the number of presented opportunities, will be encouraged to use the cost-
effective EBA decision-making technique as initial filtering tool. If this is the case then during 
the selction stage of the process the investor will be looking to identify the presence of a fatal 
flaw in any one of the critical factors to enable him or her to rapidly reject unsuitable 
opportunities. Although not necessarily conscious of their use of this technique, investors will be 
willing to sacrifice a small level of accuracy for a substantial reduction in effort.  If the investor 
cannot find a reason to reject an opportunity because of the presence of a single fatal flaw, he or 
she will allow the opportunity to be considered further at the next stage of the decision-making 
process.  
 
Hypothesis One: The presence of a single fatal flaw in a venture seeking funding will cause 
the investor to reject it as a potential investment opportunity. 
 
Certain limitations have been identified with the use of EBA as a decision-making 
technique. EBA is a filtering decision-making technique that identifies the failure of each 
opportunity to reach a minimum standard in any one of a limited number of factors to be 
sufficient reason for rejection. This technique limits the accuracy of decision-making because it 
does not allow trade offs that a more compensatory approach might. However, investigating such 
factors and trading them off against each other, is something that the investor does not have the 
time undertake with each opportunity. The investor thus adapts his or her technique, subsequent 
to the initial filtering technique to utilize alternate decision-making techniques that consider 
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additional factors to the initial critical ones and uses a compensatory approach to trade off 
between each. I suggest that there are several stages in the decision-making process before the 
final decision to invest, or not, is made – as shown in the Appendix. At each subsequent stage of 
the decision-making process, it seems likely that the investor further adapts his decision-making 
process and considers additional factors. It would thus seem logical that while the eight factors 
considered at the selection stage are used in the decision-making process, these factors alone can 
not predict the final investment decision.  
 
Hypothesis Two: For those opportunities not rejected at the selection stage there will be no 
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4. Research Methods   
Three primary constraints in previous research have been found to limit validity:  
recollection biases, selection bias and post decision data collection. These reduce the ability of 
previous researchers to provide insights that can improve funding success rates. The research 
methodology selected is specifically designed to overcome these potential biases in order to 
provide more reliable process insights. The use of real interactions between entrepreneurs and 
investors, which embed real risk and long-term relationship development during the interaction, 
will improve validity. 
The choice of enhanced real-time approach - observational interaction requires that 
interactions between entrepreneurs and investors are first video-taped and then coded by 
independent trained observers prior to extracting the data for analysis. This methodology not 
only facilitates the interpretation of negotiation behaviours and information exchanges, it also 
allows individual interaction examples to be extracted for review and illustration. Observational 
interaction relies on the assessment of interactions based on exhibited behaviours and 
information exchanges, rather than on recollections of what happened. Careful analysis of 
several interactions can provide deeper insights than participants’ recollections alone. The use of 
trained observers enables a less partisan view of relationship development and facilitates the 
observation of factors that the participants themselves may be unaware (Gottman and Notarius, 
2000). This is particularly valuable, as most previous research has gathered data based 
exclusively on investors’ perceptions, which can limit the ability to draw reliable conclusions 
from the data set.  In addition, the pitfalls of selection bias are avoided by using a data set where 
the majority of interactions result in failure. This provides valuable insights into diagnostic 
factors that differentiate between success and failure instead of the more traditional approach of 
identifying factors linked to success. Real-time data collection techniques also allow the relative 
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importance of each factor to be investigated and the mechanisms for assessment better 
understood. In addition, the use of this technique at subsequent stages of the decision-making 
process allows an improved understanding of the factors considered change and the investor’s 
decision-making techniques adapt.  
 
4.1 Context 
Our entrepreneur-investor interactions consist of a series of negotiations between five BAs 
and 50 entrepreneurs taking part in a Canadian Reality TV show – CBC Dragons’ Den. In the 
show, unrehearsed interactions between entrepreneurs and the group of five investors are 
recorded, with the expectation that the BAs, known in the show as Dragons, invest between 
$10,000 and $500,000 in a few selected opportunities. In season two of the show (2007), 150 
entrepreneurs were selected from over 1500 applications to present in the ‘Den’, and their 
interactions were recorded in CBC’s Toronto studios in May and June, 2007. Dragons’ Den is 
the property of Sony Corporation and is a globally syndicated reality TV show that is currently 
recorded and shown in ten countries. The show has a standard format, in which selected 
entrepreneurs pitch their business opportunities to five Dragons, who during the interaction must 
decide either to invest in a business or provide a reason for rejecting each opportunity.    
Entrepreneurs from across the country were encouraged to apply to participate in the show, 
with initial selection completed through regional or online auditions. Auditioning entrepreneurs 
and their businesses varied enormously in terms of experience. Some of the businesses were still 
at the idea stage, while others had several hundred thousand dollars in revenues. Entrepreneurs 
participating were motivated by their need for money, the desire to gain access to experienced 
entrepreneurs resources or simply to benefit from displaying their product on national TV. The 
150 entrepreneurs who were invited to the “Den” to make pitches for money were selected in one 
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of two categories, their likelihood of gaining investment, or their entertainment value. The 
audition process ranked every opportunity in both categories and this data was used in 
subsequent analysis to determine which opportunities should be included the sample set of 50.  
Interactions were standardized in terms of format and context. The entrepreneur started by 
stating her2 name, the nature of the proposed business and the amount of capital required. The 
Dragons would then quiz the entrepreneur on details of the business and her experience with the 
aim of deciding whether or not to make an investment offer.  If an offer was made a negotiation 
followed during which the entrepreneur had the opportunity to reject, accept or counter the offer. 
This iterative negotiation process continued until either both parties agreed on the investment 
terms, or the entrepreneur or all five investors walked away.  
Overall the Dragons rejected most opportunities, some rapidly and others after a more 
prolonged interaction. When each Dragon withdrew, he or she was required to provide a specific 
reason for the rejection of that opportunity.  Under the TV show’s rules, each Dragon, 
individually or in syndication with the other Dragons, had to invest at least the original amount 
requested by the entrepreneur, or there was no deal. However, once the investment amount was 
offered the percentage of equity exchanged for this investment was subject to intense 
negotiation.    
Actual interactions recorded in the show mirrored standard entrepreneur – BA interactions 
found in other less public environments. Line tapes of these interactions were used for this 
research on the process rather than the edited versions used for broadcast content. Line tapes are 
single continuous recordings of the live interaction that includes several camera angles as well as 
comments made between the Dragons after each interaction. Availability of these line tapes gave 
                                                
2 In the paper we will use the female form to denote the entrepreneur as we note that in 2001 in Canada more than 
47% of SMEs are owned or part owned by women, with the percentage of women entrepreneurs increasing each 
year (Statistics Canada, 2002). 
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observers the opportunity to examine and re-examine process interactions, extracting 
increasingly sophisticated levels of data for subsequent analysis. 
4.2 Data gathering techniques 
To confirm or deny our hypotheses data had to be gathered on: the stage of the decision-
making process when each interaction terminated, the funding decision for each opportunity and 
its Critical Factor Assessment score. The Critical Factor Assessment score was used to both 
identify the presence of a fatal flaw, and to rate the overall likelihood of each opportunity’s 
commercial success.  
The stage of the process at which the interaction terminated was measured by observing 
how the information exchanges between the parties changed as the interaction continued.  
Specifically at early stage in the process – selection, most information exchanges between 
entrepreneur and investor were objective. However, as the interaction proceeded to subsequent 
stages, information exchanges became subjective and required greater effort by both 
entrepreneur and investor to interpret. The change in the ratio of subjective to objective 
information exchanges was then used to determine the stage of the process and to identify 
specifically at which stage each interaction terminated.  
The process for measuring the relative subjectivity or objectivity of each interaction was 
first determined based on the approach of Kim and Myaeng (2007) who looked to determine 
objectivity in artificial intelligence systems. Using this framework, each statement made could be 
broken down into objective, subjective or indeterminate, and a ratio between the level of 
objectivity and subjectivity at each point determined. This ratio could then be compared to 
observations of interactions, where independent trained observers established the correlation 
between this ratio and the stage of the interaction.  
Using a sample data set of 20 opportunities from season one of Dragons Den to avoid 
 
    25
using the research data set influencing the coding, interactions were transcribed and analyzed 
based on the subjective or objective nature of the information exchanges. Each two-minute 
segment was examined and the ratio of objective to subjective interactions determined. Most 
initial interactions were objective (company name, nature of product, why the product was 
developed, entrepreneurs experience) but became increasingly subjective (perceived need, 
market opportunity, competitive advantage) as the interaction progressed. Ten season one 
opportunities were initially evaluated and for the three that passed the selection stage the level of 
subjective versus objective statements measured. This stage was determined to be reached when 
the percentage of objective interactions fell below 85% ± 2% (i.e. one was at 87%, one at 85% 
and one at 83%). This process was then repeated with the data set from ten more season one 
opportunities. It was found that 85% was a good benchmark for predicting when the two 
opportunities passed the selection stage from the second sample. 85% was then adopted as the 
benchmark for objectivity, when the level of objectivity in interactions fell blow this level, it was 
determined that the interactions had passed the selection of the process in the real data set.   
The Critical Factor Assessment score was for each opportunity was determined on three 
separate occasions, each by a different observer. The high inter-rater reliability obtained between 
the Critical Factor Assessment scores undertaken by the three observers, confirmed the reliability 
of the assessment tool. Observers were trained by the Canadian Innovation Centre using 
reference data from season one, where trainees were introduced to the Critical Factor Assessment 
process and then analyze a sample of opportunities. These observers were either graduate 
students or recent graduates from business and technology programmes at universities in 
Southern Ontario. Variations in the score of each factor were discussed, with the intent that the 
trainees and the trainer could come to a consensus score for each factor for each opportunity. The 
exercise was then completed with another set of samples and the category inter-rater reliability 
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assessed. If this was found to below 90%, then a discussion ensued and the training process was 
repeated. Once the inter-rater reliability exceeded 90% before any discussion between the trainee 
and the trainer, the training was determined as complete. Trainees were permitted to annotate the 
A, B and C Critical Factor categories (explained in Table 2) with + and – to allow them to 
discriminate between opportunities, however only the basic A,B, and C ratings were used in the 
training process as class inter-rater reliability was found to be of much greater significance than 
absolute scores (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979). 
The Critical Factor Assessments on each opportunity were undertaken at three different 
times. The first observer used information provided by the entrepreneur before or during the 
audition process; the second observer used the line tape of the interaction, while the third 
observer used the TV edited version. Each observer completed his or her review before the 
outcome of the interaction was known. The most important consideration was the identification 
of a C grade in any factor that corresponded to a fatal flaw. A and B grades were combined 
mathematically (using the numeric factors listed in Table 2) and this number used to determine 
the combined average Critical Factor Assessment score. Average Critical Factor Assessment 
scores were rounded to correspond to a letter equivalent as part of the entrepreneur feedback 
process. When a particular factor score for an opportunity was not obtained - due to the absence 
of relevant information, these results were excluded from the averaging process. 
Basic information was recorded about each opportunity: nature of the business, industry 
sector, revenue position, amount of money requested, and initial valuation, and the entrepreneur: 
sex, age, experience, and commitment. If the company received a funding offer, additional 
information was also recorded: valuation on funding, percentage ownership in the company 
taken by the investor/s and which specific BAs participated in the investment. 
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5. Results and analysis 
Initial evidence was found that both confirmed and illuminated the findings of previous 
research. Overall, the ability to extract qualitative and quantitative data and re-examine it for 
analysis confirmed the benefits of using observational interaction techniques. Further, the quality 
of the analysis that could be performed addressed many concerns raised about context validity. 
Focusing the research on the early stage of the process allowed selection criteria to be identified, 
decision-making techniques observed and participant behaviours noted, in each case linked to 
either rejection or less frequently to a continued interaction. Observing the first stage of a 
complex process also allowed the identification of future opportunities for extending this 
research, both into considering other factors and to investigating decision-making techniques at 
future stages of the investment decision-making process. 
The high failure rates of entrepreneurs looking for BA funding that had been noted by both 
Feeney et al. (1999) and Mason and Harrison (1994) was consistent with the results noted in this 
research. Out of 1500 entrepreneurs auditioned, only 150 met the investors and nine received 
funding offers. The staged nature of the process was also confirmed, and the change in the nature 
of the interaction as it continued observed, becoming more subjective and complex as the 
interaction progressed. The recent observations of Paul et al. (2007) and Riding et al. (2007), 
who noted the high rejection levels at each stage of the process were also confirmed as was the 
fact that on occasion the decision-making process was both non-linear and iterative, rather than 
the simpler staged approach originally modeled.  In some cases, it was observed that a stage was 
revisited several times before progress to the next stage was allowed, in other times there were 
cases when a stage was completely skipped. It was also observed that as the interaction 
progressed the nature of the interactions between each individual entrepreneur and the investors 
could develop in different ways. The differences in how these interpersonal relationships 
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developed was quite dramatic - especially at the stage where valuation and shareholder 
agreements were discussed, echoing Gardner’s (1992) observation that the process of raising 
finance is a dramaturgical process, with both the entrepreneur (actor) and investor (audience) 
interpreting the business plan (script) based on previous perceptions and experiences.    
 
5.1 Hypothesis confirmation 
Although 150 entrepreneurs met the Dragons, 100 of these were eliminated from the 
analysis  as being  of limited  interest. There  were two  primary  reasons  for such eliminations – 
TABLE  3:  
Opportunity total factor scores, fatal flaw count and disposition 
 
Idea Selected? Flaws Score Invested?  Idea Selected? Flaws Score Invested? 
1 No 1 43    26 No 7 11    
2 No 5 15    27 No 5 20   
3 No 1 41    28 No 6 17   
4 No 7 13    29 No 3 29   
5 Yes 0 53 Yes  30 No 5 17  
6 Yes 0 60 Yes  31 Yes 0 42 Yes 
7 No 5 21    32 No 4 29  
8 Yes 0 55 No  33 Yes 0 62 No 
9 No 5 28   34 No 4 23  
10 No 6 16   35 Yes 0 51 Yes 
11 No 7 8   36 No 7 12  
12 No 5 19   37 Yes 0 71 No 
13 No 3 27   38 No 6 14  
14 No 5 17   39 Yes 0 65 Yes 
15 No 2 30   40 No 8 7  
16 No 6 14   41 Yes 0 42 No 
17 No 6 16   42 No 7 15  
18 No 7 13   43 No 3 31  
19 No 4 24   44 No 1 39  
20 Yes 0 60 Yes  45 Yes 0 51 No 
21 No 8 8   46 Yes 0 46 Yes 
22 Yes 0 46 No  47 Yes 0 53 No 
23 No 4 22   48 Yes 0 67 Yes 
24 No 4 35   49 No 4 25  
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either the entrepreneur was primarily selected for his or her entertainment value (noted during 
the audition) or he or she was eliminated from serious consideration by the investors early in the 
interaction. Only the 50 entrepreneurs who had longer intensive interactions were selected for the 
actual broadcast. Each interaction was edited for TV to between three and six minutes, while 36 
shorter opportunities were also aired in 10 to 20 second slots for their  "TV entertainment” value. 
These were excluded from the data sample. All 50 opportunities that aired are included in the 
data sample, a summary is provided in Table 3 with full details in the Appendix, which includes 
every opportunity that passed the selection stage, and all that received funding offers. 
The three Canadian Innovation Centre trained assessors completed the Critical Factor 
Assessment score for each of the 50 opportunities in the data set.  Scores were converted to a 
numerical value, averaged and rounded. Inter-category rater reliability was high (95%) 
confirming the objective nature of these eight factors.  The presence of at least one fatal flaw in 
34 of the opportunities was noted and all of these opportunities rejected during the selection 
stage. No fatal flaw was noted in 16 of the opportunities, this allowed them to proceed passed the 
selection stage of the process - although only nine of these opportunities would go on to attract 
funding.  
TABLE  4:  
Frequency distribution of fatal flaws by opportunity 
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As shown in Table 4 the distribution of fatal flaws in each opportunity shows that 79% of 
the 34 rejected opportunities had four or more fatal flaws based on the observers’ assessment. 
This validated the predictive accuracy of the Critical Factor Assessment tool and was confirmed 
by the Dragons who in each case identified the same fatal flaws as reason for rejection (noting 
that the Dragons missed some flaws as some opportunities were rejected before the Dragons had 
chance to review every factor). Other factors were also linked to an investor losing interest, such 
as an unrealistic valuation by the entrepreneur. However, this was rarely a reason for early 
rejection. Instead, either the Dragons identified an alternate fatal flaw or valuation became an 
issue at a later stage in the process.  
As shown in Table 5, the Dragons rejection every opportunity that contained a fatal flaw 
confirming that this was a 100% reliable technique for predicting whether or not an opportunity 
would be rejected at the selection stage of the process. This provided initial confirmation of 
hypothesis one - the presence of a fatal flaw would stop an investment from proceeding, while 
the absence of a fatal flaw would allow an opportunity to continue to the next stage of the 
process.  
TABLE 5:  


















0 16 100% 
 Overall  100% 
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Before confirming the use of Elimination-By-Aspects as the investor’s decision-making 
technique, it is important to verify that compensatory decision-making techniques do not produce 
the same result. As the Critical Factor Assessment is a compensatory decision-making technique 
that has previously been validated and correlated to business success, using the positive scores 
derived from the assessment should also be an indicator of whether or not a specific opportunity 
can pass the selection stage of the decision-making process. However, as the Critical Factor 
Assessment score is a compensatory decision-making technique, where low marks in one factor 
can compensate for higher marks in another, our first hypothesis would suggest that using it in 
this way, rather than looking for the presence of fatal flaws,  would be less accurate.  
TABLE  6: 
Comparison of CFA score with continuing to assessment stage 
    Predicted 











Continue 2 14 88% 
  Overall   92% 
 
The compensated Critical Factor Assessment score for each opportunity was correlated 
against the stage at which each was terminated. As shown in Table 6, although this assessment 
was found to be 94% accurate, it was less accurate than the EBA technique using the same 
critical factors. The compensatory technique was more accurate at predicting when the Dragons 
decided not to allow a specific opportunity to proceed to the next stage of the interaction (97%) 
than when they chose to allow it to continue (88%). This is in part due to the high negative 
correlation between the Critical Factor Assessment scores and the presence of multiple fatal 
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flaws. The 100% reliability of the EBA fatal flaw technique confirms our first hypothesis that at 
the selection stage of the process, the non-compensatory EBA technique is used.  
The purpose of this research was to identify the nature of the decision-making process 
undertaken by investors during the selection stage of the decision-making process. An existing 
Critical Factor Assessment was used to confirm the use of EBA as the decision-making 
technique used based on the identification of fatal flaws. However, it is not clear that the eight 
factors that from the Critical Factor Assessment are all required. Given the high incidence of 
multiple fatal flaws in a single opportunity, identified in Table 4, there is a high likelihood of 
redundancy between these factors. A more detailed test of independence was undertaken, to see 
if the presence of one fatal flaw could predict the presence of another and found that none of the 
factors are completely independent.     
It is possible that some of the eight factors might be redundant, and a model with fewer 
factors would be just as successful in predicting selection. This is suggested by a number of 
follow up analyses on the data. First, the individual scores on each factor are highly correlated as 
portrayed in Table 7. Redundancy is also suggested by the fact that there is usually more than 
one fatal flaw in an idea as highlighted in Table 3, which shows, by idea, whether or not the idea 
was selected to move beyond the first stage and how many fatal flaws that idea had. Finally, tests 
of independence show that almost none of the factors are completely independent of the others.3 
These analyses all suggest that a smaller set of critical factors may be sufficient in predicting 
success in the selection stage. However, as the sample is small (n = 50), these tests of 
independence do not have as much power as they would have in a larger sample. It is therefore 
too early to claim that fewer than the full eight factors would be sufficient. In addition, there may 
be other factors, that should also be considered, that did not emerge because of the small sample 
                                                
3 Independence of factors would be shown by the likelihood of occurrence of one fatal flaw not be affected by the 
presence of another flaw. For all factors except factor 3, the hypothesis of independence of factors is rejected. 
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size. 
The correlation of factors, shown in Table 7, also provided some insights into fatal flaws 
that were often linked. The most obvious of which was that the absence of previous 
entrepreneurial experience was significantly correlated to multiple fatal flaws, and highly 
correlated to financial projections (0.86). This indicates that prior experience – whether 
successful or not_- helps entrepreneurs avoid some of the basic business flaws identified.  
TABLE 7: 
Correlations of factors within the Critical Factor Assessment 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Adoption 1.00               
2. Product Status .68 1.00              
3. Protectability .53 .56 1.00           
4. Customer engagement .62 .59 .58 1.00         
5. Route to market  .60 .60 .61 .68 1.00       
6. Market potential .78 .71 .64 .74 .73 1.00     
7.Management experience  .55 .68 .57 .45 .55 .70 1.00   
8. Financial model .67 .75 .59 .53 .66 .77 .86 1.00 
 
To confirm the second hypothesis it was necessary to show that factors considered during 
the selection stage of the process cannot predict the final investment decision. The Critical Factor 
Assessment score for each opportunity was used to study if there was a correlation between these 
scores and the final investment decision. The Critical Factor Assessment tool’s reliability as a 
predictive tool for the final funding decision, as seen in Table 8, drops to 84%, and its ability to 
predict successful outcomes is only 44%. The high accuracy levels to not fund are mainly due to 
the high negative correlation between the Critical Factor Assessment score and the presence of 
fatal flaws.  
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TABLE 8: 








To eliminate the opportunities already rejected at the selection stage from our analysis a 
logistic regression was performed to establish the correlation between the Critical Factor 
Assessment score for those remaining opportunities and the funding decision. The correlation at 
0.004 is statistically non-significant4. It is therefore possible to confirm that each Dragon must 
consider alternate factors before making his or her final investment decision.  
 
5.2 Additional observations  
The use of observational interaction as a research technique facilitated the capture of 
additional qualitative insights. On several occasions the negative effect on the investor if the 
entrepreneur provided an unrealistic valuation was observed. In addition if the entrepreneur 
presented certain information during the interaction that he or she either contradicted later or the 
BA knew to be incorrect, then the likelihood of investment seemed to be reduced. BAs also 
seemed more interested in products they could use or relate to, and also had a preference for 
businesses that had large market potential. In many cases, existing customers seemed to be a pre-
                                                
4 To confirm the inappropriateness of the Critical Factor Assessment as a predictor of the final investment decision 
a Hosmer and Lemeshow test showed a very poor fit, χ2(5) = .45, p = .994. 
    Predicted 
    Don’t fund Fund Accuracy 






Fund  5 4 44% 
  Overall     84% 
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requisite for gaining investment. Certain entrepreneurial attributes created a favourable 
disposition in one or more investors with specific BAs relating more easily to an entrepreneur 
because of a similar background or life experience. The importance of first impressions was also 
noted - based on the entrepreneur’s appearance or the quality of the presentation: confirming 
Clark’s (2008) observations on the importance of impression management.  
Observations were also made that might illuminate some of the conflicting data obtained in 
prior research, specifically around the role of investor’s domain expertise (McMullen and 
Shepherd, 2006) and the importance of the entrepreneur’s commitment (Prasad et al., 2000). 
There is conflicting evidence that shows investors more likely to invest in areas in which they 
have domain expertise. From the observations obtained in this research, I noted that an investor 
with specific domain expertise took a higher level of interest in opportunities in his or her 
domain. This led to him or her initially being more critical of an opportunity in this domain, and 
thus more willing to reject these ventures. However, if, after his or her critical appraisal, he or 
she found a venture he or she liked he or she became more willing to invest in it. On these 
occasions, other Dragons were heavily influenced in their decisions by the actions of the BA 
with perceived domain expertise.   
Entrepreneurial characteristics such as commitment (approximated as the percentage of the 
entrepreneur’s net worth invested in the business) were noted as being of interest to Dragons. 
Although there is research that entrepreneurial commitment is of importance in the investment 
decision, high levels of commitment seemed to be present in most of the entrepreneurs seeking 
funding. However, there was no evidence that higher levels of commitment were linked to 
success in obtaining investment; in fact, high levels of commitment could also be correlated to 
failure. On several occasions, entrepreneur’s commitment was perceived negatively, with 
Dragons instructing them to “Stop the madness” or “I forbid you to continue in the business”.  
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Commitment cannot be used as a diagnostic tool as it can not predict the difference between 
success and failure. 
 
5.3 Limitations and validity concerns 
The use of a reality TV show creates questions about the validity of the data and its 
subsequent analysis (Hight, 2001). The main validity concerns in comparison to standard 
entrepreneur – investor interactions are that the context was unrealistic, interaction timescales 
were compressed, deal structures were inflexible and external references could not be verified 
during the interaction. While all these concerns affect the validity, I believe that their overall 
impact was limited. For example, while the context was somewhat artificial, none of the 
interactions were predetermined or the outcomes scripted. In fact, the Dragons had no knowledge 
of an opportunity until the entrepreneur walked into the “Den”. The intent of the negotiation was 
for investors to fund presenting opportunities and the interaction dynamics that were observed 
between the parties were similar to other investor – entrepreneur interactions in less public 
domains5.  
The compressed time-scale meant that a final investment decision was reached in less than 
an hour, whereas normal investment processes usually take a series of meetings. In the traditional 
investment process, entrepreneurs are only invited to a subsequent meeting if they pass through 
the previous stage of the process (Mason and Harrison, 2003). In examining the selection stage 
of the process, I found that the interactions replicated accurately the normal time allowed for 
selection stage meetings, allowing us to draw meaningful conclusions for this part of the process. 
I believe that the compression of time-scales could be more of an issue when studying 
subsequent stages of the interaction. However, if the compressed time scales is seen as the 
                                                
5 Although TV did seem to exaggerate certain behaviours, especially when Dragons did not like a specific 
opportunity – the content of the feedback usually provided a legitimate insight into reasons for non-investment. 
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imposition of a crisis into the investment decision-making process, I can concur with the insights 
of Mishra (1996) who suggests that viewing this interaction in a crisis-situation allows us to 
obtain valuable insights into underlying behaviours.  
Although limits on deal structures reduced the number of ventures funded - for example 
debt investments were not allowed, the need to agree valuation, investment amount and post-
investment control, created a valuable dynamic between the entrepreneur and the investor that 
highlighted many of the challenges of BA investing. The generally high levels of risks in the 
investment decision were exacerbated by the investor’s inability to access referrals and 
references before making their decisions (Amatucci and Sohl, 2004). As a result, each Dragon 
had a tendency to rely more on his or her prior experience and only to use third party validation 
to verify information once the deal had been concluded in the “Den”. This subsequent stage in 
the process had the effect of causing a few deals that had been completed in the “Den” to be 
revoked after proper diligence. On balance, I conclude that the observed interactions mirror 
normal BA – entrepreneur interactions in less public environments, and provide a depth of 
insight and examples that would otherwise be unavailable. 
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6 Conclusions    
The research methodology and unique sample set allowed me to observe behaviours of 
entrepreneurs and investors involved in a funding negotiation that involved both risk and the 
intent to develop a long-term relationship. The use of objective real-time measurement 
techniques, with no knowledge of outcomes at the time of coding, allowed some of the 
constraints and biases of prior research to be reduced. This facilitated an improved understanding 
of the investment decision-making process, allowing me to identify opportunities for process 
improvement. When observing the whole process its staged nature became apparent, allowing 
me to focus in detail on the selection stage of the process.  
Hypothesis one was confirmed; that the presence of a single fatal flaw in a venture seeking 
funding causes the investor to reject it as a potential investment opportunity. This allowed me to 
suggest that the non-compensatory EBA decision-making technique was used, and validate the 
use of the eight factors from the Critical Factor Assessment technique as being appropriate to 
identify the presence of fatal flaws.  Given our small sample size and the correlation between 
factors I am not in a position to suggest that the number of factors should be reduced, although 
there was, without doubt, a level of redundancy in the eight factors used.  This confirmed some 
general observations about the importance of these factors, for example that limited 
entrepreneurial experience would also be linked to the presence of other fatal flaws. 
Hypothesis two was also confirmed; that for those opportunities not rejected at the 
selection stage - there was no correlation between their Critical Factor Assessment score and the 
final investment decision. This both confirmed that a non-compensatory technique was used at 
the selection stage and that the absence of fatal flaws alone could not predict a positive 
investment decision. It thus appears, additional factors to those analyzed using the Critical Factor 
Assessment, are considered by the investor when making their final investment decision. 
 
    39
These findings bring several important insights to the BA investment decision-making 
process. I confirmed the staged nature of the process and the use of different noted decision-
making techniques at each stage. Importantly the elimination process is used at the selection 
stage of the process, to reduce the number of opportunities to a more manageable number for 
further investigation. The identification of several critical factors that can lead to fatal flaws 
provides specific insights to entrepreneurs seeking investment. Some ides on how entrepreneurs 
can address the presence of each of the flaws is provided in the Appendix. 
 
6.1 Theoretical implications 
I hope that those interested in understanding investment decision-making will appreciate 
the benefits of using trained observers and real-time observational techniques to break down a 
complex process into stages. The use of this technique provided unbiased data that leads to 
qualitative and quantative insights on the decision-making process without affecting the 
interaction. It provides an interesting technique that can be used to further explore the investment 
decision-making process and other issues in behavioural economics. Confirmation of the staged 
model of the investment process will facilitate the development of a common process framework 
that will help address the need to understand  “the nature of the investment process itself” and the 
“various decision criteria”   (Riding et al., 2007, page 336). 
I believe that paying more attention to causes of failure, will allow researchers to identify 
opportunities for process improvement that will be easier to implement than simply replicating 
success factors. Learning from failures is a classic quality improvement approach can be applied 
to complex decision-making processes in an effort to increase interaction efficiencies and the 
percentage of successful outcomes. I believe that much previous research in this area has noted 
causes of failure, but not fully appreciated how these insights can be used.   
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6.2 Practical implications 
My research findings also have practical implications. I identified the eight critical factors 
that lead to early rejection. I suggest that an entrepreneur’s awareness of each factor can help her 
address potential fatal flaws and identify specific remedial action. In addition, simply by 
understanding specific factors of concern to investors, he or she will focus appropriate attention 
on communicating relevant information on these factors to potential investors.  
To confirm the value of understanding these fatal flaws, I organized a training session with 
participants in season three of Dragons’ Den - taped in June 2008. I provided participating 
entrepreneurs three webinars that identified and explained the eight critical factors and made 
suggestions how to address each one. In addition, as noted in the Appendix, I was also able to 
provide guidance on how to address some of the overall negative factors that had been observed 
to cause failures at each stage of the process. During the subsequent taping of season three of 
Dragons’ Den, while 30% more entrepreneurs participated, I noted that the number of 
entrepreneurs who received funding offers more than doubled and the amount proposed to be 
invested tripled. When surveyed by Canadian Innovation Centre staff, 85% of the successful 
entrepreneurs confirmed that the content of the webinars had been helpful in structuring their 
presentations and understanding the needs of the Dragons. 
The use of the Critical Factor Assessment tool can be extended into other areas. Its use as a 
teaching tool for entrepreneurs has been observed, it can also be used in a classroom 
environment for courses in entrepreneurship, where the role of BAs and his decision-making 
processes is not well understood. In addition, due to its objective nature and the ease an 
individual can be trained in its use, it can be used as an online filtering tool for those applying for 
funding to BA networks or early stage VCs.  
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6.3 Suggestions for future research         
I used observational interaction methodologies and a rich data set to draw lessons from the 
selection stage of the investment decision-making process. I believe that I can use this research 
methodology to investigate subsequent stages in the decision-making process as well as the final 
investment decision. Importantly I believe that this approach not only provides insights on other 
factors that are considered during the interaction but also how the relationship between the 
entrepreneur and the investor develops to facilitate a positive investment decision. This 
technique can also be used to answer related questions raised in other research in more detail, 
such as the role of expertise, personality and experience in both the entrepreneur and investor. I 
am aware of the importance of procedural justice, trust and culture in negotiations. I believe that 
using alternate analysis tools I can investigate these issues in more detail – for example, 
Dragons’ Den is now syndicated in ten countries some of which have expressed an interest in co-
operating on our research. It might be interesting to explore the differences in information 
exchanges and observed behaviours and the outcomes of the decision-making process in 
countries with different cultures.  
I hope that others will join us in using observational interaction to gather and share data 
about investment decision-making in the context of a staged model so that further improvements 
can be made overall process understanding. It is expected that this improved understanding will 
identify further opportunities to increase the efficiency of the investment interaction and reduce 
the high current rates of failure. It is hoped that these improved insights will also identify 
structural ways policy makers can improve interaction efficiencies. This will lead directly to 
more outcomes that are positive for entrepreneurs and investors, both during the funding 
interaction and as partners in long term venture success.  
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Adaptive Decision Making Techniques (Summary of Payne et al., 1988) 
In their paper on adaptive decision-making Payne et al., (1988) identify ten basic decision-
making strategies that vary substantially in the amount of information used and in the way it is 
used to make a choice.  
 
1. Weighted Added Compensatory Process 
The most information intensive strategy examined was a version of a weighted additive 
(WADD) compensatory process, which can be thought of as a version of expected value 
maximization. The strategy considers the values of each alternative on all of the relevant 
attributes (outcomes) and all of the relative importances (weights or probabilities) of the different 
attributes (outcomes) to the decision maker. The rule develops a weighted value for each 
attribute by multiplying the weight (probability) by the value and sums over all attributes to 
arrive at an overall evaluation of an alternative. The rule selects the alternative with the highest 
evaluation. It is often used as a criterion for decision effectiveness in multi-attribute choice 
(Zakay & Wooler, 1984). 
 
2. Random Choice Rule 
The random (RAN) choice rule, in contrast, chooses an alternative at random with no 
search of the available information, providing a minimum baseline for measuring both accuracy 
and effort. 
 
In addition to these two baseline rules, six choice heuristics and two combination strategies 
are available. 
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3. Equal weighted 
The equal weight (EQW) rule examines all alternatives and all attribute values for each 
alternative. However, the rule ignores information about the relative importance (probability) of 
each attribute. In some contexts, the equal weight rule has been advocated as a highly accurate 
simplification of the risky choice process (Thorngate, 1980).  
 
4. Elimination By Aspects 
Elimination by aspects (EBA) (Tversky, 1972) begins by determining the most important 
attribute (the outcome with the highest weight [probability]. Then, the cutoff value for that 
attribute is retrieved, and all alternatives with values for that attribute below the cutoff are 
eliminated. The process continues with the second most important attribute, then the third, and so 
on, until one alternative remains. 
 
5. Majority of Confirming Decisions 
The majority of confirming dimensions (MCD) rule (Russo & Dosher, 1983) involves 
processing pairs of alternatives. The values for each of the two alternatives are compared on each 
attribute, and the alternative with a majority of winning (better) attribute values is selected. In the 
case of an equal number of winning values for the two alternatives, one version of this rule 
retained the alternative winning the comparison on the last attribute. The retained alternative is 
then compared to the next alternative among the set of alternatives. The process of pair-wise 
comparison repeats until all alternatives have been evaluated and the final winning alternative 
identified. 
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6. Satisficing 
The satisficing (SAT) rule (Simon, 1955) considers alternatives one at a time, in the order 
they occur in the set. Each attribute of an alternative is compared to a cutoff value. If any 
attribute value is below the cutoff value, that alternative is rejected. The first alternative, which 
passes the cutoffs for all attributes is chosen, so a choice can be made before all alternatives have 
been evaluated. In the case where no alternative passes all the cutoffs, a random choice is made. 
 
There are two versions of the lexicographic choice rule: 
 
7. Lexicographic 
For the strict lexicographic (LEX) rule, the most important attribute is determined, the 
values of all the alternatives on that attribute are examined, and the alternative with the best 
value on that attribute is selected. If there are ties, the second most important attribute is 
examined, and soon, until the tie is broken. Because the simulation generates attributes as 
continuous random variates, ties almost never occur.  
 
8. Lexicographic Semi Order 
The lexicographic semi-order (LEXSEM) rule (Tversky,1969) is similar to the strict 
lexicographic rule, but introduces the notion of a just-noticeable difference (JND). If several 
alternatives are within a JND of the best alternative on the most important attribute, they are 
considered to be tied. The potential advantage of the LEXSEMI rule is that it ensures that an 
option that is marginally better on the most important attribute but much worse on other 
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attributes will not necessarily be selected. 
 
There are also two combined strategies that are commonly observed in studies (Bettman & 
Park, 1980):  
9. Elimination-by-aspects plus weighted additive (EBA+WADD) rule.  
This rule uses an EBA process until the number of available alternatives remaining was 
three or fewer, and then uses a weighted additive rule to select among the remaining alternatives.  
 
10. Elimination- by-aspects plus majority of confirming dimensions (EBA+MCD) rule. 
This rule uses an elimination-by-aspects process to reduce the problem size, and then a 
majority of confirming dimensions heuristic to select from the reduced set.  
 
These choice strategies differ on a number of aspects, such as the degree to which the 
amount of processing is consistent or variable across attributes or alternatives, the pattern of 
processing (alternative based or attribute based), and the total amount of processing. The various 
strategies represent different combinations of these aspects. The weighted adding strategy uses 
consistent and alternative-based processing and examines all available information. The equal 
weight strategy uses consistent and alternative-based processing but uses a subset of the 
available information. The MCD rule is consistent, attribute-based, and ignores weight 
information. The EBA rule implies a variable (selective) pattern of processing that is attribute 
based. The total amount of information processed by EBA depends on the particular values of 
the alternatives and cutoffs. The lexicographic strategies are also selective and attribute based, 
and the satisficing strategy is selective and alternative based. The total amount of information 
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processed is also contingent upon the particular values of the alternatives for these strategies. As 
illustrated in the figure below, each of these alternative decision-making techniques requires 
different levels of effort. It is noted that increasing levels of effort in decision-making result in 
greater levels of accuracy in the decision. 
TABLE X: 
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TABLE XI 
 Recommendations to entrepreneurs to increase chance of obtaining financing 
 
 Category Specific Recommendation 
1 Reference Identify a trusted referrer who can facilitate investor introduction and provide 
then with some guidance of venture and entrepreneurial quality  
2 Reference  Ensure that you understand the investment preferences and prior investment 
experience of the Business Angel before a meeting. 




Ensure business addresses each of the critical factors identified – if there are 
critical flaws develop a specific strategy to overcome them 
5 Exit strategy Demonstrate how the investor will make their ROI and identify liquidity event -
for example identify potential acquirers.   
6 Expected 
Value 




Show BA participation in the venture can reduce performance risk - through their 
complementary assets or domain expertise 
8 Relationship 
risk 
Identify how interests of investor and entrepreneur can be aligned and the 
existence of successful prior relationships  
9 Equity 
participation 
Show how the invested money will be used, the logic behind your valuation and 
flexibility but not weakness in the negotiation. Value the BA’s contribution.  
10 Focus on Fit Show an understanding of how the relationship will develop and the importance 
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1 Sue Arkinsawla Xmas tree holder 10 9 1 4 4 5 5 5 No  43 10 1 
2 Terry Email 2 1 1 5 0 0 1 6 1 No  15 8 5 
3 Chris Nellum Lettuce 5 5 2 5 4 8 6 6 No  41 8 1 
4 Matt Stanson Xmas light switch 1 4 1 2 2 1 1 1 No  13 7 7 
5 Theresa Hill Horse treat 9 9 6 5 8 6 5 5 Yes Yes 53 10 0 
6 Jessica Borsons Atomic tea 9 9 5 8 9 9 6 5 Yes Yes 60 10 0 
7 Mikeli Eronka Arctic snow shovel 5 4 1 5 2 2 1 1 No  21 9 5 
8 Andrew Appelbarn Cereal bar 6 8 4 8 9 8 6 6 Yes No 55 10 0 
9 David Tonkin Takeover plan 1 9 1 1 1 1 9 5 No  28 5 5 
10 Yuri Paresavich Swing ball 5 4 1 1 1 2 1 1 No  16 6 6 
11 Erin Brodep Homeless sign 0 5 0 1 1 1 0 0 No  8 5 7 
12 Michael Labraque Bottle water 5 5 1 0 1 2 1 4 No  19 7 5 
13 Chath. Hiscocks Baby carrier 4 4 1 6 5 4 1 2 No  27 7 3 
14 Jodi Sendon Homebox 4 2 0 4 1 4 1 1 No  17 9 5 
15 Lynden Slandy Seat cover etc. 5 4 0 6 4 5 4 2 No  30 8 2 
16 Karen Note cards 1 4 1 4 1 1 1 1 No  14 8 6 
17 Christopher Doors Fruit-picking 2 2 1 4 4 1 1 1 No  16 6 6 
18 Felix family Sweet tomato jam 1 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 No  13 8 7 
19 Uncle D Ad.content website 5 5 1 4 4 2 1 2 No  24 8 4 
20 Jim Edison Pylon 9 8 9 9 6 8 6 5 Yes Yes 60 9 0 
21 Louis Pevartte Rocket skate 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 No  8 6 8 
22 Doug Stables  Underwater vehicle 9 8 9 5 4 4 3 4 Yes No 46 7 0 
23 Al Daline Dog trailer 1 6 1 4 4 1 1 4 No  22 8 4 
24 Trent Kitch Underwear 8 8 2 6 2 6 2 1 No  35 10 4 
25 John Korish Steel monument 1 4 6 1 1 1 1 1 No  16 7 6 
26 Victor Pachenko  Stem clearing house 1 0 2 4 2 1 0 1 No  11 6 7 
27 Jason Pete  Aerotag 6 5 0 4 1 1 1 2 No  20 8 5 
28 Peter Ranking Gold digging 1 1 4 1 9 1 0 0 No  17 7 6 
29 Sandy Adelson Golf-sucker 1 5 4 9 4 4 1 1 No  29 8 3 
30 Myrin Garscho Screen for garage 4 4 0 2 1 4 1 1 No  17 5 5 
31 Noami Berlis 
Children’s 
literature 8 6 4 6 5 5 4 4 Yes Yes 42 8 0 
 






















A+ 10 B+ 6 C+ 2 
A 9 B 5 C 1 
A- 8 B- 4 C- 0 








































































32 Daniel Warren Party website  9 4 0 8 5 1 1 1 No  29 9 4 
33 Jay Warren Dog biscuit 8 10 6 10 8 9 5 6 Yes No 62 8 0 
34 Daniel Foyer Customized jeans 4 4 1 1 1 2 5 5 No  23 9 4 
35 Janet Colborne Support bra 5 10 8 10 5 5 4 4 Yes Yes 51 8 0 
36 Robin Round Menopausal 2 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 No  12 8 7 
37 Chris Holden Pizza box 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 Yes No 71 10 0 
38 Ken Gone Fishing funnel 1 4 1 4 1 1 1 1 No  14 6 6 
39 Dan Izner  Mortgage broker 8 9 5 8 9 8 9 9 Yes Yes 65 10 0 
40 Shawn Alexander Hairdresser website 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 No  7 6 8 
41 Fred Day Rifle scope 4 6 6 8 6 4 4 4 Yes No 42 9 0 
42 Todd Kelly Cutlass razor 1 4 1 6 1 1 1 0 No  15 7 7 
43 Laksh. Sinderan Spice mixers 4 7 2 4 5 5 2 2 No  31 8 3 
44 Jody Uttriution Shimmer 6 6 2 8 4 5 4 4 No  39 8 1 
45 Joe Demar Packaging 9 5 8 9 4 8 4 4 Yes No 51 8 0 
46 Steve Kingsbery Exercise mat 8 8 6 6 5 5 4 4 Yes Yes 46 10 0 
47 Elduado Kotch Core training - 8 8 7 8 6 7 4 5 Yes No 53 6 0 
48 Randy Ones Rhinno bag 9 9 8 9 8 8 8 8 Yes Yes 67 10 0 
50 Patel children Tomato soup 9 6 5 6 4 7 4 6 Yes Yes 47 8 0 
                
